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Intelligence Information Report

Classified by Recorded Supporting Officer. Exempt from Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 58 (1), (2). Automatically downgraded on approval of Director.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTR. 7 SEPTEMBER 1972

COUNTRY BRAZIL

DOI EARLY AUGUST 1972

SUBJECT 1. ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN NORTHEAST.
2. ACTIVITIES OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRAZIL (CPB) IN GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2003

ACQ

SOURCE

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SECRET

(Classification) (Dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CIA	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
FBI							

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1. [redacted]

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2. THE BREAKTHROUGH WHICH LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF THREE GUERRILLA BANDS OPERATING IN THE AREA OF MARABA, PARA, AND IMPERATRIZ, MARANHAO, WAS THE CAPTURE OF A COUPLE IN BRASILIA CIRCA MAY 1972. THE HUSBAND HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE MARABA GUERRILLA OPERATIONS, BUT HE BECAME DISAFFECTED WHEN HIS WIFE BECAME PREGNANT AND WAS EXPOSED TO THE REVOLUTIONARY HARDSHIPS. AT THAT POINT HE EMBEZZLED MONEY SENT BY THE CHINESE-LINE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRAZIL (CPB) FROM THE SOUTH FOR THE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN BRAZIL.

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4. WHAT IS KNOWN THUS FAR IS THAT THE CPB WAS THE SOURCE OF MEN AND MONEY FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE MARABA AREA. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAME FROM EARLIER ROBBERIES AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE SUCCESSES IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF BRAZIL. THE IDEA WAS TO LAUNCH A TRIAL BALLOON FOR RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE. THE PLAN CALLED FOR GRADUAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION AND RECRUITMENT OF THE LOCAL POPULATION THROUGH EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, AND OTHER RURAL SERVICES BY CPB ACTIVISTS INFILTRATED AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL. THIS PLAN WAS IN FACT PUT SLOWLY INTO EFFECT OVER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. THE CPB ACTIVISTS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR OBJECTIVES, HOWEVER. THE CPB TRIAL BALLOON AT MARABA, IN CONTEXT OF RURAL LAND REVOLUTION, ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE FAILED. ALTHOUGH UNWILLING TO MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MARABA GUERRILLA GROUP, THE PCB DOES RECOGNIZE VALUABLE SIDE BENEFITS IN HAVING GENERATED CRITICISM OF THE GOB AT HOME AND ABROAD. GIVEN THE CHANCE, THE ARMY, THE CPB BELIEVES, WILL ALWAYS OVER-REACT. THUS, THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IS STUDYING IDEAS FOR FURTHER BAITING THE ARMY AT THE LOWEST RISK.

5. THE CPB ORGANIZATION IN RURAL NORTH AND NORTHEAST BRAZIL OPERATED ROUGHLY IN THREE SEPARATE GROUPS OF APPROXIMATELY 17 MEN EACH. MOST WERE AND ARE YOUNG, RECENT GRADUATES OF UNIVERSITIES, FROM THE SOUTH, PRIMARILY SAO PAULO. CPB IN SAO PAULO DESCRIBED AS HIGHLY IDEALISTIC, AND THEY WERE SOMEWHAT CYNICALLY SENT

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BY THE PARTY TO MARABA AS GUINEA PIGS. IN REPLY TO DESPERATE PLEAS FROM THAT GROUP FOR ADDITIONAL HELP, THE CPB CALLED A SPECIAL MEETING AT WHICH THE DECISION WAS MADE TO DENY FURTHER SUPPORT REQUESTED. NO HIGH-LEVEL CPB LEADER WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED ON THE SPOT IN THE MARABA ACTIVITIES. HIGH RISK WAS LEFT TO THE NOVICES. THE MARABA SITUATION IS NOT BELIEVED AN INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN TACTICS FROM URBAN TO RURAL GUERRILLA ACTION. RATHER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT, AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF THE CPB, THE PARTY WILL SEIZE UPON TARGETS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OPPORTUNITY AS PERMITTED BY GOB'S REPRESSIVE POLICY.

6. THE RADICAL WING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NORTH AND NORTHEAST BRAZIL DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AROUND MARABA. THE BISHOP OF MARABA, HOWEVER, IS DEFINITELY SEEN AS A RANKING CHURCH COLLABORATOR OF THE SUBVERSIVES. A FEW OTHER PRIESTS AND NUNS HAVE ALSO BEEN INVOLVED, BUT APPARENTLY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

7. SINCE MARCH 1972, SIX OF THE GROUP HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND FOUR WERE KILLED; ALL TEN ARE BELIEVED TO BE FROM THE SAME SUB-UNIT OPERATING IN THE MARABA AREA. AT LARGE AND IN HIDING ARE APPROXIMATELY 40 OF THE ORIGINAL CPB RURAL COMMAND. THESE MEN ARE BELIEVED TO STILL BE IN THE AREA, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE DISENGAGED FROM ALL BUT DEFENSIVE PARA-MILITARY OPERATIONS. MEANWHILE, THE ARMY CONTINUES A SEARCH, SEIZE, AND DESTROY OPERATION. PRESIDENT EMILIO GARRASTAZU M E D I C I REPORTEDLY IS ANGERED BOTH BY THE INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS FROM OPERATIONS

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MOUNTED BY THE EIGHTH ARMY, AND THE UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY FROM THEIR SOMETIMES HEAVY-HANDED AND OVER-ZEALOUS EFFORTS.

8. FIELD DISSEM: CONSULATE GENERAL AT RECIFE: SENT TO CINCSO,